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The paper explores the characteristics of spatial price movements for fresh vegetables. The analysis is conducted on 
tomatoes and cauliflowers prices collected on main production and consumption European markets. It is based on the 
estimation of an asymmetric threshold autoregressive econometric specification that is shown capable of providing 
estimates of transaction costs and speeds of price transmission among spatially separated markets. We provide an 
assessment of the average elapsing time for the transmission of price shocks. Our findings, suggesting that spatial price 
transmissions in the EU vegetable sector is barely symmetric, lead to interesting policy considerations for the fresh 
vegetables sectors. 
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The European Union (EU) is both the largest importer and one of the largest producers in 
the fresh fruits and vegetables (F&V) world market. Production is concentrated in a few countries, 
namely Italy, Spain, and France. A vast majority of the EU fresh F&Vs trade is intra-EU and 
imports from third countries are rather limited, especially for vegetables, in that the prohibitive 
transportation costs reduce extra-EU trade. Germany and the United Kingdom are large importers, 
whilst Belgium and Netherlands represent the main actors for intra-EU trade: the latter imports and 
re-exports to many EU countries.  
Seasonality, supply sensitiveness to climate conditions, and products perishability are 
relevant peculiarities of EU F&Vs. Arguments of this kind have enjoyed a particular vitality and 
have become important to discussion of agricultural policies. According to the European 
Commission Council Regulation (EC 1182/2007), «the production of fruit and vegetables (is) 
unpredictable […] and surplus on the market, even if (they are) not too great, can significantly 
disturb the market». Production variability might influence price dynamics, leading to market 
instability and the onset of market crises, which tend to be exacerbated by product perishability, 
sensitiveness of production or consumption to climate variations, and lack of sustainability (EC, 
2007a). In order to stabilize the markets, the F&V Common Market Organization reform has 
introduced instruments for risks management (EC, 2007b) whose efficacy is largely affected by the 
spatial and temporal prices dynamics. In such a context deepening the understanding of fresh F&Vs 
price dynamics would lead to interesting policy implications such as guidelines to plan 
interventions aimed at preventing and managing market crises, or aimed at increasing the sector 
sustainability. 
During the last decade, several scholars have dedicated much attention to applied analysis of 
the degree and speed of price transmission, in view of their wide and relevant policy implications 
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(e.g. Brümmer et al., 2009; Ubilava, 2012; Santeramo and Cioffi, 2012). Moreover, there is a 
growing interest of researches for aspects concerned with the asymmetries: most scholars have paid 
attention to empirical validations (e.g. Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2004 for a survey; Capps 
and Sherwell, 2007) and to theoretical speculations (e.g. Weldegebriel, 2004, Fousekis, 2008 and 
Xia 2009, among others). As far as the fruits and vegetables sectors is concerned, the vast majority 
of articles on spatial price dynamics are not related to the European Union (e.g. Jordan and 
VanSickle, 1995; Padilla-Bernal, Thilmany and Loureiro, 2003; Ihle et al., 2010) and, except for 
very few papers (e.g. Goetz and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2008, Reziti and Panagopoulos, 2008), the 
characteristics of spatial price transmission in the EU F&Vs sectors are still underinvestigated.  
Therefore, the purpose of the present paper is to explore the dynamics of vegetable prices 
among EU spatially separated Regions. In particular, we aim at answering some still debated 
questions: to what extent are price shocks in vegetable markets transmitted across separated 
markets? How fast price dynamics in the EU vegetable sector are transmitted across Regions? 
A comparison between the price transmission phenomenon in two of the main EU 
vegetables by volume of production, namely cauliflowers and tomatoes, may be a helpful way to 
proceed. Empirical results are obtained by mean of a non-linear specification which allows one to 
estimate transaction costs and (asymmetric) speeds of adjustment to price shocks.  
The remainder or the paper is as follows: in section 2 we outline the features of the EU 
(F&Vs) sectors, with particular emphasis on the vegetables under analysis; section 3 describes 
methodology and data; section 4 presents and discusses empirical results; the last paragraph offers 











The European Union is one of the biggest global producers of Fruits and Vegetables: 
despite a recent declining trend, its production accounts for more than 8% of world production 
(more precisely, the EU supplies respectively 12% and 7% of world fruits and vegetables). 
Grapes, the largest fruit, are produced in Italy (30%), France (25%) and Spain (22%), followed 
by Germany, Portugal and Greece. 30% of total EU vegetables production is represented by 
tomatoes which are largely produced in Italy and Spain. Carrots, cabbages, lettuces and 
cauliflowers show also conspicuous volumes of productions: more than 2 millions of tons per 
year (Table 1). 
< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 EU members are characterized by different consumption profiles: Italy and Spain, both large 
producers and large consumers, have rather limited volumes of imports; France shows large 
volumes of production and trade, while Germany and United Kingdom are net-consumers and 
importers since their production is minimal; Belgium and Netherlands play an important role in 
F&Vs trade, especially through re-exports.  
Italy and Spain are the largest EU fresh tomatoes producers. Spanish fresh tomatoes are 
traded to Northern Europe, mainly toward France, United Kingdom, Germany and Netherlands. In 
some cases imports from Spain cover a large share of total import of destination countries. In other 
terms, Spain plays a dominant role in fresh tomato intra-EU trade and is certainly defined as net-
producer and net-exporter. Almeria and Murcia are the first and second provinces by export 
volume, respectively: the former concentrates its exports during winter, the latter shows a more 
stable and wider export season (de Pablo Valenciano and Perez Mesa, 2004). French production 
amounts to 700.000 tons per year and seems minimal compared to import volumes. The largest part 
of French production is concentrated in Southern areas while in Northern France the largest part of 
production is realized in Chateau-Renard rural areas1.  
                                                           
1
 In 2006-2008 Spanish yearly exports to France, the United Kingdom and Ireland amounted respectively to 153,000,  
172,000 and 4,500 tons. During the same period France exported 9,500 tons per year to Spain, 7,600 tons in the United 
Kingdom, and 400 tons to Ireland. 
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EU cauliflower production is mainly concentrated in six Countries (in descending order of 
production volume: Italy, Spain, France, Poland, Germany and United Kingdom), accounting for 
more than 90% of total EU production. The main Spanish production areas are Murcia, Navarra, 
Valencia and La Roja, which satisfy 85% of total Spanish production. The United Kingdom 
production is located in Southern England and Lincolnshire county. Spanish exports serve United 
Kingdom (40%), Germany (15%), France (13%), Netherlands (13%), as well as other EU countries 
(e.g. Ireland, Belgium, etc.). United Kingdom export mainly to Ireland, besides to the Netherlands, 
Italy, Germany and Spain2.  
< TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
As regard the EU supply chain, we can distinguish three different levels: a quite 
fragmented supply, with few multinationals (e.g. Chiquita) and a majority of small producers; 
the second level consists of importers and wholesalers, with the formers handling import 
formalities, directly selling products or benefiting from re-export, and the latter buying from 
producers and importers, as well as supplying specialist retailers, supermarkets and foodservice 
outlets; the third level consists of multiple or specialized retailers showing a high degree of 
concentration, particularly in Northern Regions (e.g. in France, United Kingdom, Netherlands 
and Scandinavia retailers supply more than 70% of the market). During last decades the 
concentration of buyers has been growing consistently, leading to imbalanced market power 
along the food supply chain. Nowadays, despite an increasing number of fixed contracts, the vast 
majority of fresh fruits and vegetables are still traded in spot markets where prices are directly 




                                                           
2
 During 2006 and 2008 Spain exported, on average, 96,000 tons to United Kingdom, 32,000 tons to the Netherlands 
and more than 5,000 tons to Ireland. The United Kingdom served Ireland (8,000 tons per year), the Netherlands (1,200 
tons per year) and Spain (200 tons per year). 
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3. The economics and econometrics of price transmission: our methodological approach 
 
  
According to the well-known Law of One Price (LOP), prices in separated markets tend do 
differ by no more than shipping costs incurred in moving a good from one market to the other3:  
(1)  |  |  	 ,  
where  and  are prices observed in markets A and B respectively,  and  are 
transactions costs4 for trade, respectively, from A to B and from B to A. If price spreads exceed 
transaction costs - regardless the trade direction -, arbitrageurs’ activity will reduce the spread 
letting prices move toward condition (1).  
Threshold models, allowing to explicitly take into account transaction costs (e.g. Goodwin 
and Piggott, 2001), offer a successful empirical framework to validate the LOP. In particular, the 
equilibrium model proposed by Balke and Fomby (1997) has been widely adopted in price 
transmission analysis5; we adopted the following specification: 
(2)  ∆   · ∑ ∆   !"  #                
where ∆Xt and $      are ( % 1) vectors of price spreads and price spreads first-order 
difference, with '  1, … ,  (total observations). Prices and price spreads are expected to be 
respectively I(1) and I(0).  and   are the coefficients matrices to be estimated, εt is a ( % 1) 
vector of i.i.d.~ N(0, )*) error terms,  is the Heaviside indicator or the “switching variable”. The 
indicator +,-./, which assumes value 0 or 1, is analytically defined as follows: 
+,-./   0+,-./  1      1 X 3 -. +,-./  0     1 X 5 -. 6  
where |-.| is an estimate of transaction costs. By defining $      we assume that -. would 
be a proxy for , and -. would be a proxy for . We restrict 7-.7  |  -.| which implies 
                                                           
3
 A formal definition is provided by Stiglitz (1993) who stated “there is a uniform price in the market and price 
differences are quickly eliminated by arbitrage [opportunities]”. 
4
 Transactions costs include both transfer costs (i.e. transportation, loading and unloading costs, taxes, etc.) and other 
costs of trade, such as the cost of acquiring price and other market information, or maintaining market networks. 
5
 For example, recent applications in spatial price transmission regard wheat (Brosig et al., 2011), paddy (Baulch et al., 
2008), peaches (Raper et al., 2009) and tomatoes markets (Ihle et al., 2010) among others. 
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symmetry in transaction costs. The band 8-, -9 represents the so called symmetric “inactivity 
band” where no arbitrageurs’ activity takes place. 
The band is a proxy for transaction costs, which can be expressed in currency term with the 
ratio of  band width and average import price. Dependent variable (∆) is generally positive, since 
it is computed subtracting export prices from import prices. The model assumes that arbitrage 
opportunities drive prices toward the inactivity band edges, where LOP is satisfied with equality. 
Deviations in the upper regime signal excessive increases in import prices (), while deviations in 
the lower regime are due to export prices decreases ( ). The outer regimes – particularly, the 
upper regimes determined by   : -. and the lower regimes occurring when   5 -. - 
follow an autoregressive process and the ;< coefficients indicate the expected speeds of adjustment: 
the farther the deviation from the band edge, the stronger the adjustment6. Balke and Fomby (1997) 
showed that, despite a possible local random walk inside the band, the process is globally 
stationary. By assuming a random walk in the inner regime it is also assumed that prices are not 
linked to each other. According to our econometric specification, when shocks occur and price 
spreads exceed the band, in absolute value, prices tend to converge toward the equilibrium point 
and to equalize. From this perspective, the specification seems coherent with the formulation of the 
LOP stated by Alfred Marshall7.  
An underlying assumption of specification (2) is that parameters ;< assume the same values 
both for the upper regime and for lower regime. However, it is worth stressing that such a 
restriction is satisfied only when two conditions are jointly satisfied: 1) both the upper and lower 
regimes contain observations; 2) coefficients estimated for the two outer regimes are not 
statistically different. Moreover, this restriction implies that a similar process drives prices 
                                                           
6
 When ∆ exceeds the band edge, e.g. the export price ( ) falls and prices spread moves into lower regime, there are 
only two ways for price spread to be reduced and return to be lower than the band width: 1) the deviating price ( ) 
raises and price spreads return within the band; 2) import price () falls accordingly, such that prices spread return 
within the band. The former way does not imply a price transmission, the latter does, and the faster the reaction of the 
other price, the faster the deviation returns inside the band. 
7
 Alfred Marshall (1980) argued that the more an area is characterized by free commerce and perfect competition, the 
more the prices for the same goods will tend to converge on a common level. 
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dynamics in two different cases: a) when import price is “too high” and     : - (upper 
regime); b) when export price is “too low” and     5 - (lower regime). Some 
considerations cast doubts on the restrictions imposed on parameters ;<: firstly, when trade does not 
occur in both directions there might be no observations in one of the two outer regimes; secondly, 
even when trade occurs in both directions, price dynamics can differ in the two outer regimes8 in 
that the characteristics of the EU vegetable sector supply chain, with fragmented suppliers and 
concentrated buyers, are likely to lead to asymmetries in prices transmissions. Meyer and von 
Cramon-Taubadel (2004) argued that there might be several explanations for asymmetries in price 
transmission: among others, market power and adjustment costs (Ward, 1982), non-equivalence of 
demand and supply shocks (von Cramon-Taubadel, 1998), distorted price reporting process (Bailey 
and Brosen, 1989), asymmetric information (Abdulai, 2000), product perishability (Ward, 1982). 
Moreover, in a context of spatial price transmission among net exporters and net importers, the 
asymmetries in prices transmission might depend on whether the disequilibria are due to shifts in 
the (importer) demand or the (exporter) supply - regardless the underlying assumptions on perfect 
or imperfect competition (Gardner, 1975; Kinnucan and Forker, 1987; Holloway, 1991)9 - as well 
as on changes in transaction costs10. It is worth to note that studies using threshold models are 
generally descriptive rather than analytic and usually are not based on a rigorous theory of price 
determination (Obstfelfd and Taylor, 1997; Minot, 2010). Despite some limitations in the approach, 
analysis of spatial price transmission in the vegetables sectors through threshold models is 
groundlessly missing in the literature (Capps and Sherwell, 2007). 
                                                           
8
 More precisely, if trade occurs mostly from the export market (A) to the import market (B) we would estimate ; only 
in the upper regime. Moreover, when trade occurs in both directions, we might observe different price dynamics in the 
“normal” outer regime (i.e. when     : - and trade occurs from the export to the import market) and in the less 
frequent outer regime (i.e. when      5 - and trade reverses from the import to the export market). 
9
 Such a theory is tellingly supported by Aguilar (2002) and Capps and Sherwell (2007), among others. 
10
 A referee suggested that, if price movements are due to changes in transaction costs, the transmission elasticity would 
converge to zero for “small” importers – as the price changes would be fully absorbed by the import price -  and would 




As a preliminary analysis we tested for unit root in price levels and price spreads, expecting 
unit-root processes in price levels and stationarity in price spreads. Secondly, we tested for 
asymmetries in prices transmission and estimated an asymmetric threshold model.  
Following Goodwin and Piggot (2001) and Van Campenhout (2007) we simplified 
specification (2) by excluding the autoregressive terms of the dependent variable11:  
(3)  ∆   ·    #                
where   is a (3 % 1) vector with unrestricted elements (; > ;?). Parameters ; and ;? are 
estimated only if observations are respectively in the upper and lower regime. We imposed a unit 
root behaviour inside the band where the coefficient ; has been set equal to zero, that is ;*  0. 
Coefficients ; and ;? have a clear economic interpretation being proxies of adjustment 
forces after deviations from equilibrium have exceeded the inactivity band edges. The lower the 
coefficients, in absolute value, the weaker the adjustment forces and the higher the price inertia. 
Conversely, high coefficients imply that price deviations are strongly and rapidly corrected toward 
the equilibrium. 
The threshold - is estimated by solving the following minimization problem:  
(4) 
 
-.  minCD∆$  ,-./ · ∑ ∆   !"E*  
The estimation is conducted by imposing a minimum percentage (trimming parameter) of 
observations in the inner and outer regimes. Andrews (1993) argues that percentageS between 5% 
and 20% should be considered good choices for trimming parameters. Following Seo (2003) we 
require that both the inner and the outer regimes contain at least 10% of the total observations, 
therefore the trimming parameter is set to 0.1. Threshold estimations are computed through a grid 
search, and coefficients are estimated by least squares. Tsay (1998) showed that, under regularity 
conditions, least squares estimates are consistent, a characteristic that greatly simplifies the 
modelling and estimation process of TAR models.  
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The testing procedure for threshold effects is conducted through tests of linear versus non-
linear models (Hansen, 1999). In particular, a feasible approach to infer on asymmetry is to 
compare the sum of squared residuals of linear and non-linear models (Hansen, 1997, 1999). 
Therefore we test for non-linearity by computing a likelihood ratio test as follows:  
(5)  FG  2I	JK,L|CM/KDΩ|CMEO    
where P. represents the estimated threshold, L and Ω stand for the symmetric and asymmetric 
models, respectively 12. The test rationale is to assess whether the outer regimes are statistically not 
different from each other: failure to reject the null hypothesis suggests to adopt a symmetric model, 
while if the null is rejected a 3-regimes asymmetric model should be preferred.  
The estimation results of specification (3) offer useful insights of vegetables prices 
dynamics. Firstly, the estimated transaction costs, proxied by -., provide a benchmark to understand 
the markets efficiency in transmitting price signals. In particular, the larger the -. with respect to the 
expected transaction costs, the lower the estimated transmission elasticity13 and the market 
efficiency14. Secondly, it is worth deepening on the estimates of coefficients (ρ) in that they are 
directly interpretable as speeds of adjustment for deviations that exceed upper or lower edge of the 
inactivity band.  
In particular, estimations provided by specification (3) are interpreted by computing the 
adjustment periods, the average time for series to achieve partial adjustment to the new equilibrium 
after a deviation has occurred. More precisely the adjustment periods indicate the time required for 
prices to achieve ε% adjustment to their new equilibrium levels following an exogenous shock and 
are expressed at same time series frequency of prices series (e.g. weekly, monthly, etc.). For AR(1) 
process a ε% adjustment period is computed dividing the logarithm of ε by the logarithm of 1+ ρ 
                                                           
12
 We estimated a symmetric model by imposing ;  ;?. 
13
 The expected (E[τ]) and the estimated (Q̂) transmission elasticity are calculated respectively as follows: S8Q9  /UUUU 
and Q̂  VW/UUUU 
14
 In particular, as market efficiency is defined as « the degree to which markets […] match supply with demand » 
(Rashid and Minot, 2010), large transportation cost implies a large band in which no price adjustments, and no matches 
among (export) supply and (import) demand occur (Minot, 2010). 
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(e.g. X  50% is computed by [\D]._E[\ D`abE). As ρ appears in the denominator of the formula of 




4. Data and empirical results 
 
 
The analysis has been conducted on cauliflowers and tomatoes, two of the main vegetables 
by volume of production for which data were available15. The products are very suited for the 
analysis both due to the large volume of production and trade within the EU, and the relative 
differences characterizing these products. In particular, they differ by degree of perishability and by 
incidence of fixed costs on total transportation costs: cauliflowers are classified “highly perishable” 
(Thorne and Meffert, 1979), as their shelf-live are around one week, and their trade shows high 
incidence of fixed costs on total transportation costs16; tomatoes are “half-hardly storable” (Thorne 
and Meffert, 1979) and their shelf-lives are around four weeks. The dataset consists of weekly 
prices (in €/100 Kg) spanning from 1996 to 2006 and extracted from the AgriView database of the 
European Commission17. For perishable products weekly data seem more appropriate than monthly 
data as the latter might fail to capture price movements due to the rapid marketing (Aguiar, 2002). 
In order to avoid the potential bias deriving from nationally aggregated data (von Cramon-Taubadel 
et al., 2006), prices have been collected on significative markets in six different EU countries: 
cauliflower prices have been collected on markets of Den Bosch (Netherlands), Dublin (Ireland), La 
Roja (Spain) and London (United Kingdom); tomatoes prices have been collected on markets of 
Almeria (Spain), Chateau-Renard (France), Dublin (Ireland) and London (United Kingdom).  
                                                           
15
 More precisely, the analysis has been conducted on tomatoes and cauliflowers due to the lack of continuous weekly 
prices collected on the main European markets. The results neither comprehensive not exhaustive of the EU vegetables 
sector, provide useful insights on price dynamics in markets of perishable goods. 
16
 More precisely, traders of perishable produce experience investments to improve the logistic before and during the 
shipments (e.g. produce preparation, specific packaging, refrigeration cells, etc. ) in order to reduce the expected losses 
for spoilage and preserve the quality of the produce.  
17
 Due to the missing data issue, we selected the markets on which to carry out according to data availability, in 
particular we selected the longest series with smallest percentages of missing price data (generally less than 8%). Series 
with gaps have been merged to obtain continuous time series. 
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< TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
 
4.1 Cauliflower  
 
As a preliminary analysis we tested for stationarity in the individual price series by 
implementing the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). For all series we reject price stationary at a 
5% significance level18. Moreover, we performed ERS unit-root tests (Elliott et al., 1996) and KPSS 
stationary tests on prices spreads: results suggest no unit roots in price spreads19, a preliminary 
condition to estimate our threshold models. In most cases the tests on threshold effects reject 
linearity in favour of non-linear specifications20. 
< GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE > 
Estimation results of specification (3) are collected in table 421. In order to test for 
robustness in parameters estimations we increased/decreased the estimated band by 10%: the results 
are not affected by the sensitivity analysis22. 
We found values of inactivity band ranging from 4.7 €/100 Kg - which accounts for 12% of 
the average London import price - to 47.4 €/100 Kg - which reflects 72% of the Den Bosch prices. 
These findings on estimated thresholds require further comments, as we found a low correlation 
(0.12) among inactivity band width and geographical distances. Excluding the estimated value for 
the London – La Roja pair from the set the correlation raises to 0.28 which still seems a low value 
to support the existence of any significant relationship among markets’ physical distance and 
transaction costs. In particular, we found large transaction costs for markets very close to each other 
(e.g. Dublin and London), while we observed low transaction costs for markets relatively far from 
each other (e.g. Dublin and LaRoja; London and La Roja). Such an evidence supports the 
                                                           
18
 Test statistics (and p-values) are respectively 0.596 (0.022), 0.603 (0.022), 1.064 (0.001) and 1.057 (0.001) for Den 
Bosch, Dublin, La Roja and London.  
19
 Results are omitted for simplicity and available upon request.  
20
 P-values of linearity test (1 vs 2 regimes), calculated based on 1000 bootstrap replications, are smaller than 0.1 in all 
but one case (Dublin and La Roja).  
21
 In order to deal with potential bias due to missing values, we introduced several dummies for seasonal gaps. 
Dummies are statistically not significant and results are not affected by dummies. For simplicity, we do not present 
dummies in tables of econometric results. 
22
 Results are omitted for simplicity and are available upon request.  
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mentioned concept that in cauliflower trade the fixed portion of total transaction costs are likely to 
have high incidence (cfr. Mkendaa and Van Campenhout, 2011): it is worth observing that the trade 
of high perishable products requires specific logistic (e.g. packaging, refrigeration, ventilation, etc.) 
in order to avoid spoilage losses and to preserve the product quality (James et al., 2006). As far as 
market efficiency is concerned, we found that the estimated transmission elasticities are not 
statistically different from the expected transmission elasticities (except for the price transmission 
between Dublin and La Roja). Our results allow to conclude on the market efficiency in cauliflower 
markets. 
In all but one case price transmission seems to not be symmetric. In particular, only for the 
pair of London and La-Roja markets, two locations close to main production zones, deviations 
occur in both outer regimes. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of asymmetry, suggesting that 
adjustments occur with similar speed23. The other cases do not present deviations in the lower 
regime hence coefficients cannot be estimated.  
 





The null hypothesis of stationarity is rejected for individual prices series (at 10% 
significance level) 24 as well as for prices spreads (at 1% significance level)25. In most cases 
threshold effects are statistically significant26. 
< GRAPH 2 ABOUT HERE > 
                                                           
23
 Test statistics of two versus three regimes is 13.937, corresponding to 0.383 p-value. 
24
 Test statistics (and p-values) are respectively 0.479 (0.046), 0.043 (0.009), 0.531 (0.035), 0.763 (0.001) and for 
Almeria, Chateau-Renard, Dublin, London.  
25
 Results are available from authors upon request.  
26
 P-values of linearity test are smaller than 0.1 for three out of five cases: test statistics are respectively 25.83, 37.91, 
34.44, 12.47 and 12.74.   
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Table 5 presents estimates for the tomatoes markets27. In order to test for robustness in 
parameters estimations, we replaced the estimated band with a 10% larger/smaller band, finding 
that results are almost identical28.  
The inactivity band, a proxy for transaction costs, accounts for 38% of average import 
prices: highest values are observed among far locations, in particular among Spanish and English or 
Irish markets. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of no statistical difference between the expected 
and estimated transmission elasticities in all but two cases: the results suggests market inefficiency 
between London and Almeria and for London and Chateau-Renard. The correlation (0.46) among 
distances and transaction costs suggests that variable costs are a not-negligible part of total 
transaction costs. In order to quantify the effects of distance on the inactivity band, we regressed the 
former on the latter. Based on results, we can state that increasing distance to destination by 10 Km 
would lead to a 0.1% increase in incidence of variable transportation costs on total costs. As a 
clarifying example, if transport costs from location A to B, which are distant 200 Km from each 
other, have incidence of 15% on final prices realized in location B, the shipping costs to reach a 
location 210 Km far from A would account for 15.1% of final selling price.  
< TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE > 
Price transmissions among Almeria, leading market for Spanish tomatoes production and 
trade, and other EU markets predominantly occurs in one direction. Similarly, deviations in price 
transmissions between London and Chateau Renard occur only in the upper regime. Finally, prices 
in Dublin and Chateau Renard are symmetrically transmitted29.  
 
 
                                                           
27
 In order to deal with potential bias due to missing values, we introduced several dummies in to take into account 
seasonal gaps, from the end of a season to the beginning of the following season. Dummies are statistically not 
significant and results not affected by dummies. For simplicity, we do not present dummies in tables of econometric 
results. 
28
 Results of this sensitivity analysis are available upon request.  
29
 The asymmetry might be due to the different role played by United Kingdom and France within the EU trade 
framework: the former has very low production and its production is almost entirely satisfied by imports, the latter has 
considerable production which satisfies more then 70% of domestic consumption.  
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4.3 On the adjustment periods 
 
Price adjustments in the vegetables sectors have been interpreted by computing the 
adjustment periods, that is the time required for price series to achieve a partial adjustment to the 
new equilibrium (Table 6).  
< TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE > 
As far as cauliflowers are concerned, we found that the adjustments are slower in the upper 
regime than in the lower regime. In the former, the half-lives (ε=0.5) range from 1.9 to 3.6 weeks, 
being 3 weeks on average, while in the lower regime the highest value is 0.7 weeks. Full 
adjustments (ε=0.9) would take two or three months in the upper regime and two weeks in the 
lower regime. The findings suggest that disequilibria due to excessive import prices rises require a 
longer time for the adjustment than disequilibria due to sudden export price decreases. As expected, 
a vast majority of deviations occur in the upper regime (22% at minimum) and only 14% are in the 
lower regime. Different speeds of price adjustments, with lower transmission of price rises, suggest 
that retailers might exert their market power delaying price rises and avoiding reduced sales that 
would result in larger spoilage (Ward, 1982). 
For tomatoes markets, we observed heterogeneous speeds of adjustment: tellingly, Spanish 
prices halve rises in import prices within three weeks, while French prices require less than two 
weeks to achieve a 50% adjustment. Deviations in the lower regime tend to achieve a 50% 
adjustment within one week, and prices fully adjust in less than two months. Coherently with 
previously mentioned results, deviations in the upper regime (30% on average) are more frequent 
than deviations in the lower regime (6%), and, in general, asymmetries in price transmission seem 








Price transmission in the European vegetables sectors is still underinvestigated. Our paper 
has focused on price dynamics of two main vegetables within the EU F&V sector: cauliflowers and 
tomatoes. We have adopted a prices transmission model by using weekly data collected on different 
EU Regions. In particular, we have provided an assessment of the estimated transaction costs and of 
the average elapsing time for transmission of prices shocks. 
The analysis shows that transaction costs account only for 12% of variable costs in 
cauliflowers trade, and for more than 35% of import prices in the tomatoes sector; distance and 
transaction costs are positively correlated. In most cases prices transmission is unidirectional, since 
trade flows occur from Regions with large production volumes to net-importer Regions. Moreover 
we have found that prices rises tend to be transmitted within two or three weeks, while deviations 
due to prices decreases are corrected within a week.  
On the grounds of the mentioned findings we can conclude that price rises due to scarce 
harvests or unexpected increases in demand tend to be slowly transmitted and might barely interest 
distant Regions; on the contrary market perturbations originated by price decreases - due to 
unexpected over-productions, large imports increases, consumption decline, etc. – spread across 
several EU Regions. Such a phenomenon is more evident for the cauliflowers than for the tomatoes 
sectors: as Ward (1982) has convincingly demonstrated, the high perishability (of cauliflowers) and 
the inability to delay sales through temporary storage implies that decreases in wholesale (or net-
exporters) prices have a larger effect on retail (or net-importers) prices than increases. 
The results of our analysis lead to interesting policy considerations. A first implication is 
related to the degree of market integration of the EU vegetable sector that emerged from our study. 
Since transfer costs are rather held down, European markets tend to partially adjust to price shocks 
in few weeks, achieving a full adjustment in few months. The European market of vegetables are 
integrated and price signals are transmitted in few weeks: on one hand, this implies that market 
stabilization policies can be planned at the EU level, or, at most, at a national level; on the other 
hand, despite market disequilibria tend to affect the whole EU market, their effects (in terms of 
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magnitude) are spanned to several Countries with reduced intensity. Secondly, we found clearer 
evidence of asymmetry in prices transmission and faster transmission of low prices in cauliflowers 
markets. The findings would suggest that markets of perishable products tend to be more sensitive 
to market crises, and that, for highly perishable products, public intervention at the common level, 
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 Table 1 – Vegetablesa most produced in EU (1000 tons) 
  
  
       
  
Annual production     
      2005 2007   2009 
      Tomatoes 23,049 20,973   23,195 
      Cabbages  12,527 10595   11745 
      Carrots 8,857 7,855   8,481 
      Lettuce 3,479 3,425   3,332 
      Cauliflower 2,305 2,301   2,335 
      
      
    
      
a
 Includes both vegetables for direct consumption and for processing. 
 
  
       Source: our calculations from FAOSTAT data. 
  
  
       
  
  
         Table 2 – Production and trade of cauliflowers and tomatoes by Countries, 2004-2008 (tons). 
    
 
  Cauliflowers 
     Netherlands Ireland   Spain United 
Kingdom 
     Production 54,500 7,440   443,617 204,500 
     Import 29,653 8,934   6,045 117,532 
     Export 23,646 1,459   246,363 4,549 
     Apparent consumption a 60,507 14,915   203,299 317,483 
        Tomatoes 
     France Ireland   Spain United 
Kingdom 
     Production 713,873 10,600   4,199,606 83,244 
     Import 463,872 27,129   95,103 416,960 
     Export 135,514 1,908   950,685 4,659 
     Apparent consumption a 1,042,232 35,821   3,344,025 495,545   
    
  a Apparent consumption is: (production + import) – export. 
      Source: Our elaboration from FAOSTAT 
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Table 3 - Descriptive statistics of market prices 
  
  
       
  
Observations Mean  
(€/100 Kg) 




     Cauliflowers markets       
     Den Bosch  233 65.3   54.73 42.01 
     Dublin 339 47.07   44.91 13.57 
     La Roja 469 30.23   28.93 8.86 
     London 469 40.83   36.91 16.59 
         
     Tomatoes markets       
     Almeria 221 58.47   49.66 28.58 
     Chateau Renard  221 84.65   79.51 32.45 
     Dublin 221 108.32   99.45 40.04 
     London 221 90.66   77.68 42.94 
     
      
      
     
  
  
       
   
  
       
   
  
       
   
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  
  
       
  Table 4 -  Prices transmission in cauliflowers markets 
T a 
[ % of        ]
  
Den Bosch – LaRoja 35 
Dublin – LaRoja 17 
London – LaRoja 11 
Den Bosch – London 24 
Dublin – London 6 
  
 a 
 The expected transaction costs are T = E[PB- PA] 
 b 






θ  t-stat Trasmission elasticity ρ1 ρ3 
   Expected Estimated (# of obs.) (# of obs.)
            
47.4  1.94 0.46 0.28 -0.117 
  [72%]   (65) 
21.3  2.81 0.64 0.55 -0.179 
[45%]   (113) 
4.7  -4.18 0.74 0.88 -0.228 -0.623 
[12%]   (294) (67) 
25.6  0.16 0.63 0.74 -0.174 
[26%]   (71) 
6.1  0.04 0.87 0.87 -0.305 -0.888 




    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
 
   Symmetry / Km 
  Asymmetry a   
     
 A 1,450 
   
 A 2,050 
   
 S 1,452 
   
 A 481 
   
 A 584 




   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 Table 5 -  Prices transmission in tomatoes markets 
 
 
 T a 
  
Chateau Renard – Almeria 26 
Dublin – Almeria 50 
London – Almeria 32 
Dublin – Chateau Renard 24 




 The expected transaction costs are T = E[PB- PA] 
b 





   
   
 
θ t-stat  Trasmission elasticity ρ1 ρ3 
[ % of        ]   Expected Estimated (# of obs.) (# of obs.)
            
32.3 0.72  0.69 0.62 -0.251 -0.591 
[38%]   (92) (6) 
53.4 0.63  0.54 0.43 -0.222 
[57%]   (45) 
62.9 7.20  0.64 0.42 -0.178 
[58%]   (66) 
8.1 -7.42  0.78 0.91 -0.499 -0.639 
[9%]   (107) (54) 
32.1 3.29  0.93 0.7 -0.341 
[30%]   (62) 
            
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
  
  
    
 
  
Symmetry /  Km 
  Asymmetry b  
     
 A 1,810 
   
 A 2,908 
   
 A 2,310 
   
 S 1,910 
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  Table 6 -  Adjustment periods in cauliflowers and tomatoes markets 
  
 
  Adjustment period (weeks)   Adjustment period (weeks) 




   
 




   
 
   Cauliflowers  
 
  
   
 
   Den Bosch – LaRoja 
-0.117 5.6   11 19 
  
Dublin – LaRoja 
-0.179 3.5   7 12 
  
London – LaRoja 
-0.228 2.7   5 9 -0.623 0.7 1 2 
  
Den Bosch – London 
-0.174 3.6   7 12 
  
Dublin – London 
-0.305 1.9   4 6 -0.888 0.3 1 1 
  
          
  




      Tomatoes 
 
  
      Chateau Renard – Almeria 
-0.251 2.4   5 8 -0.591 0.8 2 8 
  
Dublin – Almeria 
-0.222 2.8   6 9 
  
London – Almeria 
-0.178 3.5   7 12 
  
Dublin – Chateau Renard 
-0.499 1.0   2 3 -0.639 0.7 1 3 
  
London  – Chateau Renard 
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